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 1 
ABSTRACT 
 
Community and economic development decisions affect every aspect of city life. 
Allentown, Pennsylvania is currently in the midst of redevelopment financed by one of 
the largest state subsidies in the commonwealth’s history, the Neighborhood 
Improvement Zone (NIZ) (Assad, 2017). The NIZ is an unprecedented state tax subsidy 
that most closely resembles locally-financed Tax Increment Financing (TIFs). Despite 
being the most utilized financing tool for urban redevelopment, the impacts of TIFs are 
still largely unstudied. The burgeoning literature trying to assess the effectiveness of TIFs 
is often too small in scale, focusing just on the redevelopment zones isolated from their 
surrounding neighborhoods, and utilizes misguided metrics of community and economic 
development success. This paper employs more comprehensive metrics like poverty 
rates, housing stability, and incomes of residents. It looks to analyze the effect the NIZ 
development has had on high poverty neighborhoods adjacent to the NIZ against 
comparable neighborhoods throughout the state, and examine how the city has trended as 
a whole over the span of NIZ development in context with analogous cities throughout 
the state. The paper also assesses whether the benefits of downtown development have 
spread throughout the city or remained isolated to the development zone, while trying to 
understand some of the mechanisms of TIFs that precipitate large sums of private 
investment that seldom benefit a city beyond the target area. Using census tract level data 
from the American Community Survey, I found that the lowest income neighborhoods in 
Allentown had higher rates of poverty than would be expected if those neighborhoods 
kept pace with similar high poverty neighborhoods in other cities. Additionally, these 
high poverty neighborhoods had no significant increase in incomes or employment 
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compared to similar neighborhoods statewide. Furthermore, when compared to a cohort 
of comparable cities, Allentown’s metrics of economic wellbeing have lagged. Lastly, I 
found that the economic benefit of the NIZ has not spread beyond the development zone. 
While the development is still very much in its infancy, these findings point to a need for 
a reassessment of the development strategies, and the creation of parallel mechanisms to 
ensure the subsidy more broadly benefits the City of Allentown. 
Key Words: Neighborhood Improvement Zone, Allentown, Economic Development, Equity, Tax Increment Financing  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 3 
Introduction 
 Allentown, Pennsylvania, like many other mid-Atlantic industrial cities, was hit 
hard by the Great Recession. By 2012, a full four years after the generally recognized 
start to the recession, persons living below the poverty line, as a percentage of total 
population, soared 4.2 percentage points from pre-recession levels, unemployment was 
up 6.3 percentage points, and housing vacancy had increased by nearly 1,500 units (U.S. 
Census Bureau, 2007 - 2012). It was in this context that the State of Pennsylvania, led by 
State Senator Pat Browne, passed the 2009 PA Act 50, creating the Neighborhood 
Improvement Zone (NIZ). Act 26 of 2011 and Act 87 of 2012 further defined and 
amended the regulations around the NIZ (PA Department of Revenue, 2018).  Two more 
amendments were made to the law in 2013 and 2016. The NIZ is a zone of 127 acres 
located in center city Allentown and along the western side of the Lehigh River 
(ANIZDA, 2017).  
 The NIZ is a one of a kind tax subsidy that allows developers to capture state and 
local tax dollars to pay off the debts accrued in bonding to develop their commercial 
buildings (ANIZDA, 2017). These tax diversions pay down both interest and principal on 
the original loans. Developers then pass on the subsidy to businesses that locate in their 
buildings in the form of lower rents. The developer who has taken advantage of this 
incentive the most, City Center Investment Corporation, is projected to utilize $1.3 
Billion of would-be state and local tax dollars by the time the legislation expires in 30 
year (Assad, 2017). The projected developments of City Center Investment Corporation 
alone would make the NIZ legislation one of the largest subsidies the state has ever 
offered. Pennsylvania offered such a generous subsidy to the developers in Allentown in 
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the hopes that the redevelopment would precipitate property values to rise to a level 
where the additional taxes generated, the increment, would offset the subsidy. It remains 
to be seen whether the development will achieve those desired ends. Furthermore, that 
debate is outside the scope of this study.  
Here I look to assess whether the millions of dollars that have already been 
diverted are an effective development tool. To evaluate effectiveness I look at three key 
components of development: 1) how has the development affected adjacent communities; 
2) how has the city done as a whole with respect to other comparable cities; and 3) have 
the benefits spread out throughout the city, or are they confined to a specific geographic 
location? I answer these questions by comparing a comprehensive list of metrics of 
development between Allentown and five comparable cities in Pennsylvania. The five 
cities are: Erie, Reading, Bethlehem, Lancaster, and Harrisburg. Additionally, the metrics 
of economic health will be compared against the state average over the same time. The 
data is taken from the Census Bureau's American Community Survey. This study begins 
in 2013 because that is when the PPL Center, a publicly financed arena in the center of 
the NIZ, and multiple office buildings underwent the bulk of their construction. 
Numerous other buildings opened in each of the subsequent years (City Center, 2018).  
 The use of publicly subsidized sports arenas and entertainment venues as a form 
of economic development is a contentious issue in city politics. It is less hotly debated by 
economists, however, as there is a rather broad consensus that these arenas typically fail 
to live up to their income growth and job creation promises, and the opportunity costs of 
those size subsidies could be better spent otherwise to achieve economic development 
(Coates and Humphreys, 2008; Wolla, 2017; Cockrell, 2017). While the NIZ legislation 
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also authorized the public financing of the PPL Center, and no comprehensive assessment 
of its impact on the community exists, this study does not look to disaggregate the effects 
of the PPL Center and the new office buildings. It also does not look to just assess the 
success of the blocks included in the NIZ, but rather the success of the city at large. A 
city-wide revitalization was the rhetorical promise of the NIZ by prominent architects and 
implementers of the legislation from its inception, and those narratives persist 
unchallenged today (Kraus & Assad, 2014; Tierney, 2014; McEvoy 2017).  
 
Literature Review 
 
Community Economic Development Theory 
 Economic development, in its modern sense, traces its origins to the progressive 
politics of the New Deal and the rapidly expanding post-war economy. Industry elites and 
politicians, especially at the city-level,  cooperated in what John Mollenkopf first named 
pro-growth coalitions, to orchestrate mutually-beneficial urban development that was 
meant to improve the business environment and win political constituencies that 
supported and benefited from the urban development being implemented (Mollenkopf, 
1983). These coalitions were a staple of the Democratic Party across many US cities, 
funded by liberal federal grant monies, but eventually found a home in the Republican 
Party as well, albeit targeting different constituencies. Republican leadership, under 
Eisenhower and Nixon, shifted the focus from public housing accommodations and 
general social welfare policies towards the promotion of commercial districts and “urban 
renewal” policies.  
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It was at this time, during the early 1970s under Nixon’s presidency, that the 
federal government started outsourcing many functions of economic development to 
nonprofit and for-profit corporations (Chapple, 2012).  Community development, viewed 
originally as the work of social organizations, and economic development, led by the pro-
growth coalitions, coalesced into a single field in the wake of Lyndon Johnson’s war on 
poverty as a response to intractable poverty caused by federal policy (Dreier, Mollenkopf, 
and Swanstrom, 2004; Chapple, 2012). Community Development Corporations (CDCs) 
increasingly began to concern themselves with local economies. Community Economic 
Development (CED) was overseen as a managerial and promotional pursuit, mostly in the 
formal institutions of Chambers of Commerce and CDCs, for the sake of attracting 
exogenous, typically large corporations to their cities (Teitz, 1994).  
Beginning in the mid 1980’s, a decade after the end of the federal government’s 
“urban renewal” policies, public officials and CDCs began to see themselves as more 
than managers of business attraction, but in effect entrepreneurs responsible for driving 
local small business growth through innovation and creative approaches (Eisinger, 1989). 
 These entrepreneurs focused on making their local constituencies more competitive 
through improving education, stimulating research, and improving business infrastructure 
(Isserman, 1994). Development organizations and local governments have more control 
over endogenous development conditions, and these locally focused strategies have be 
shown to be sustainable in terms of enduring growth and community development 
(Stough, 2001).   
As of the mid 1990’s these two development paradigms, attracting exogenous 
corporations and enhancing endogenous businesses, were complemented with what 
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Andrew Isserman called “knowledge and process”, which essentially looked to 
streamline the process of business and maximize efficiency of local economies as to both 
improve the local businesses and attract outside companies. In 1997 Michael Porter 
suggested that city development should reorient to stop pursuing policies that made cities 
competitive with less dense regions for business attraction, and instead highlight their 
natural assets like unmet customer demand, strategic location, industry clusters, and 
available workforce (Porter, 1997).  
Throughout this evolution of CED, much of the focus was centered on 
specifically two metrics: job growth and property values (Man, 2001; Dye and Merriman, 
2006; Bryne, 2006; Smith, 2006; Chapple; 2012). As Richard Dye and David Merriman 
have elucidated, economic growth in certain neighborhoods can come at the expense of 
economic well-being elsewhere in the city. Additionally, job growth and property values 
do not depict the full story of a neighborhood’s economic health. For example, rising 
property values are a benefit to homeowners who see their assets increase and are thus 
permitted to access lines of credit through their properties, but it can simultaneously hurt 
tenants in the community who are expected to pay higher rents in turn. As Timothy 
Bartik details in his theoretical analysis of local development policies, economic 
development, especially of high-skill firms, can often benefit in-migrants at the expense 
of low-skilled workers and the unemployed (Bartik, 1991). As such, neither job growth 
nor increased property values are sufficient to determine the success of development 
policies for preexisting businesses and residents. The more comprehensive the list of 
economic metrics, the better picture of community vitality.  
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Data constraints limit the depth to which this study can explore neighborhood 
success. Still, the metrics selected are a combination of those employed by two studies 
that did a particularly thorough job teasing out the impact of economic development 
policies: Meagan Ehlenz’s assessment of development in University City, Philadelphia, 
and Charles Swensons’ study of 5,000 census tracts throughout California (Ehlenz, 2015; 
Swenson, 2015). This study will particularly focus on poverty rates, unemployment, 
incomes, vacancy rates, housing costs, and transiency within neighborhoods. This more 
comprehensive economic assessment better allows the analysis to consider the true 
improvement to quality of life conditions, which I contend is the most important 
consideration in any development strategy.  
This type of thinking about economic development, known as equity planning, 
was popularized in the early 1990s by scholars and practitioners like Norman Krumholz. 
Equity planning contends, particularly when public subsidies are involved, that poverty 
rates, municipal budgets for services, and unemployment should be given primacy over 
high end commercial projects (Krumholz, 1991). The true arbiter of success is how 
broadly the benefits are shared and to what magnitude.     
Tax Increment Financing Theory 
Allentown’s Neighborhood Improvement Zone (NIZ) is a one of a kind special 
tax district that has precipitated over $1 billion in new or proposed development (Assad, 
2017). Because of its unique features and lavish incentive structure, there is no exact 
comparison to be made with past tax incentive policies. Within the broader field of CED, 
the NIZ development most closely compares to Tax Increment Financing (TIF). 
However, unlike most TIFs, which generally divert only real-estate taxes, Allentown’s 
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NIZ allows developers to tap non-property local taxes, like earned income, and 
essentially all state taxes including, but not limited to, payroll taxes, income taxes, 
cigarette taxes, liquor taxes, sales taxes, and capital stock taxes (Pennsylvania 
Department of Revenue, 2019).  
TIFs originated in California during the early 1950s as a way to match federal 
block grants, but remained relatively uncommon and mostly used only on the west coast 
until the 1970s (Weber, 2002). As of the mid 1990s, TIFs had become the most utilized 
financing tool for redevelopment in the country (Briffault, 2010). They originated as a 
complement to urban renewal policies heavily focused on remediating or removing blight 
from central cities, but have since evolved to focus more on overall economic stimulation 
and redevelopment. The expansion and redefinition of TIFs corresponds with a decrease 
in federal dollars for city aid and development, declining housing conditions in urban 
areas, and rising opposition to tax increases (Johnson and Kriz, 2001). In general, Tax 
Increment Financing is a system wherein a specific district is designated for 
redevelopment with the future increases in real-estate property taxes being earmarked to 
be spent in the district for public improvement. The authorizing government, typically a 
city, can also sequester taxes that would be paid to overlaying districts like a school, 
county, or special district (Merriman, 2018). The literature is quite clear that the major 
challenge to comprehensive, nationwide, assessment of the effectiveness of TIFs is the 
fact that the statutory guidelines vary drastically from state to state and city to city. As 
such, the success of a Tax Increment Finance district is highly dependent on local 
economic factors, the benefits granted, and duration of the zone.  
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No comprehensive typology of TIFs exist because of their variable nature 
between states’ authorization and municipal implementation. However, they can 
thematically be split according to the mechanism used to finance them and end usage of 
the increment generated. Accordingly, developer-financed TIFs will be the focus of this 
paper because the method of increment generation and expenditure is most proximate to 
the function of Allentown’s NIZ (Merriman, 2018). In developer-financed TIFs, 
developments are funded through conventional lenders who offer lines of credit to 
developers. When the TIF revenue becomes available, the developer is allowed to capture 
the increment and use it to pay down their interest and principal to the creditor 
(Merriman, 2018). This subsidy is then passed on to tenants in the form of lower rents.   
 In his 1999 theoretical inquiry into TIFs, Jan Brueckner highlights that local 
improvements are typically met with opposition from property owners living beyond the 
affected region. TIFs, by utilizing the appreciation of property values to finance 
development projects, and tapping overlaying tax districts, allow cities to improve local 
conditions without increasing taxation, thus quieting the opposition of more traditional 
public improvement financing (Bureckner, 1999). While politically expedient, Brueckner 
argues that the allocation of resources may ultimately be inefficient and the revenues 
generated insufficient. In her 2001 review of several TIF-adopting cities in the Midwest, 
Joyce Man finds mixed results, with some cities in Michigan and Indiana experiencing 
faster property value growth than control cities. But, those results were not found in 
Illinois, where non-TIF-adopting municipalities outperformed the districts that had 
adopted TIFs (Man, 2001). A 2006 study by Richard Dye and David Merriman found that 
TIF-adopting municipalities did not outperform non-adopting cities in terms of property 
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value growth, and furthermore within cities that had implemented TIFs, the TIF district 
detracted from growth elsewhere in the city (Dye and Merriman, 2006).  
 While raising concern about the impacts of TIFs, analysis such as these are few in 
number and also affected by the primary shortfall of the current literature evaluating 
TIFs: a narrow set of metrics by which they measure successful development. This is 
mirrored in the analysis of CED more broadly. Common methods in evaluating success 
contend that the growth of property values, and sometimes employment rates, are the two 
best dependent variables to assess. This is a limited view of success because property 
value growth does not benefit every stakeholder in cities, most prominently tenants who 
can face steeper rents in neighborhoods where property values are increasing, and 
employment does not necessarily speak to the quality and stability of jobs, let alone the 
affordability of basics like housing and food, given the incomes generated from those 
jobs. Additionally, this analysis is limited in disaggregating who is actually benefiting – 
whether they be long-time residents or newcomers to the community. While the 
aforementioned metrics are important to assess, they must be supplemented with metrics 
like poverty rates, changes in income, and housing stability to better understand the 
quality of life created by development policies. 
 
Hypothesis 
As discussed earlier, TIFs have been the most widely used redevelopment tool in 
the US for the past two decades. This is not necessarily due to their efficacy, however, as 
much as to their political expediency (Bureckner, 1999; Briffault, 2010). TIFs do not 
require new tax dollars, as the subsidy comes from deferred future tax payments, and they 
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often produce impressive new development. The limited literature is clear that TIFs 
successfully produce construction growth beyond what would have occurred in the 
absence of public financing (Dardia, 1998; Johnson and Man, 2001; Chapple and Jacobus 
2009). What is more contentious is the degree to which the development is worth the 
subsidy, let alone beneficial community development. In fact, TIFs often fail to even 
generate enough revenue to cover the cost of the subsidy (Dardia, 1998; Weber, 2003). 
Furthermore, many benefits of the subsidy fail to materialize beyond the investment 
corridor due to shifting of economic activity within the area and limited spillover effects 
(Chapple and Jacobus, 2009).  
The idea of large development creating border vacuums that insulate the 
investment from the broader community, and even lead to blight and stagnation along the 
boundaries, was popularized by Jane Jacobs in 1961 (Jacobs, 1961). This is often a 
product of the border signaling a lack of welcome and participation. Large development 
tends to alienate the participation, economic or otherwise, of residents who do not feel as 
though the new space is meant for them. Allentown’s stadium development and the 
contiguous high-end retail district mirrors this sort of large scale development. A 2017 
quality of life survey was conducted for residents of Center City Allentown and found 
that one third of residents responded to the question, “To what extent do you feel a part of 
the new development in the downtown area,” as “not at all.” (Deegan and Baker, 2017).   
With the NIZ development most closely mirroring TIF development, I 
hypothesize that the lowest income census tracts surrounding the NIZ will fare no better 
than similar high poverty tracts throughout the state in metrics of income, unemployment, 
and poverty since the construction of the NIZ began. Based off of the work of Chapple 
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and Jacobus, and Dye and Merriman, I expect that there has been little spillover benefits 
to these high poverty census tracts, and perhaps the detrimental effects of shifting capital 
out of those tracts into the NIZ. Secondly, I anticipate that Allentown as a whole has not 
outperformed comparable cities during the duration of the NIZ as assessed by income, 
poverty, unemployment, housing costs, and neighborhood transience. This expectation is 
based off of the literature finding that TIF-adopting municipalities often do not 
outperform non-adopting municipalities (Man, 2001; Dye and Merriman, 2006). Lastly, I 
expect that the census tracts containing the NIZ  have markedly better economic 
indicators, five years after construction began in full, than the adjacent census tracts and 
non-adjacent tracts that are also within the city limits. This expectation is premised on the 
findings of minimal spillover effects of large development and Jacob’s border vacuums 
concept (Chapple and Jacobus, 2009; Jacobs, 1961). 
 
Methodology 
 Census tracts are the level of analysis in each of the three sections of this report. 
Census tracts are statistical subdivisions made by the United States Census Bureau to 
group between 1,200 and 8,000 people, although the optimal size is considered 4,000 
people (U.S. Census Bureau, 2012). While neighborhoods are subjective constructs that 
conform to the perceptions of those who use them (Coulton, et. al., 2001), census tracts 
often serve as a proxy in social science research for neighborhoods (Ehlenz, 2015; 
Swenson, 2015). Data for census tracts is readily available, consistent, and certifiable. As 
such, this paper employs census tract level data to understand conditions in various parts 
of Allentown and Pennsylvania. Data for these tracts comes from the Census Bureau's 
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American Community Survey. The time frame of this study is from 2013, the year 
substantial construction began on the PPL Center and other NIZ buildings, until 2017, the 
year of most recent data.  
For the first part of the study comparing high poverty neighborhoods, data is 
collected for 11 high poverty census tracts surrounding and including the NIZ, and 
compared against 45 other high poverty tracts throughout the state. Two high poverty 
census tracts exist in Allentown that are beyond the distance threshold to be considered 
NIZ-adjacent, explained further below, and thus they are grouped with other high poverty 
tracts in the control group. High poverty is defined as having at least 30% of residents of 
that tract living below the poverty line starting in 2013 (Galster, Quercia, Cortes; 2000). 
The control tracts are limited to the five control cities for this study, and must have 
complete data over the five-year timespan. The control cities are the five successively 
largest Pennsylvania “Third Class Cities” after Allentown, and as such are regulated 
under the 2014 PA Act 22 (Pennsylvania General Assembly, 2014). They are Erie, 
Reading, Bethlehem, Lancaster, and Harrisburg.  
The second section of this study compares Allentown as a whole against those 
five cities during the same period. Metrics employed include median income, owner 
occupancy rates, poverty rates, median rents, unemployment rates, median home values, 
property vacancy rates, transience, and cost-burdened rates. The rates and figures for 
each of the five control cities are then averaged together to arrive at a single figure 
against which Allentown’s rates and figures are compared.  
The final section looks at trends within three zones in Allentown according to 
median rent, median income, a rent-to-income index variable, and homeownership. The 
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first zone is the NIZ. It comprises 127 acres along Hamilton Blvd between 5th and 10th 
streets and along the western front of the Lehigh River. Some parts between 5th and 10th 
streets extend to Linden Street with one block extending as far north as Turner Street. 
There are also a few stand-alone parcels that are not contiguous with the primary block of 
NIZ development. While construction is beginning along the riverfront, no buildings 
have opened as a result of NIZ development. The remainder of the NIZ is almost entirely 
within the boundaries of Lehigh County Census Tract 97, with very little existing outside 
of the tract and the overwhelming majority of development occurring within its 
boundaries. While there is not an exact overlay, using Census Tract 97 serves as a strong 
proxy for the streets within the NIZ. The second zone is referred to as NIZ-adjacent. 
These are the contiguous census tracts around Census Tract 97 that are within three 
quarters of a mile of the NIZ via roads. There are 13 such tracts1. The final zone is non-
adjacent tracts within the city. These are more than three quarters of a mile from the NIZ 
via roads, and there are 14 such tracts.  
 Statistical analysis is performed for each of the three sections. The first section 
has enough time-series data and an adequate sample size (n=112) to perform three 
difference in differences regressions. The dependent variables for the three regressions 
are poverty rates, median income, and unemployment. All three analyzed the independent 
variable of interest being the NIZ construction as represented by the interaction term of 
the two dummy variables for proximity to the NIZ and the time of its construction. For all 
                                                          
1 Lehigh County Census Tract 14.01 is not considered NIZ-adjacent because although it boarders 
Census Tract 97, the roads leading from the edge of the NIZ to the residential buildings in Tract 
14.01 are more than three quarters of a mile away. Additionally, due to the steep topography, 
intersection of the Little Leigh Creek, and local consideration of that area to be “on the south 
side”, it is sufficiently removed from the NIZ development to be considered non-adjacent. 
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three regressions of high poverty tracts, the residuals are plotted against fitted values and 
visually examined to reveal a general congruity around the mean (Williams, 2015). 
Additionally, a Breusch-Pagan/Cook-Weisberg test for heteroscedasticity is conducted. 
The data shows chi-square values below the critical value for a regression with six 
degrees of freedom (Williams, 2015; van Belle, et. al, 2004). Both tests indicate that the 
data is not detrimentally impacted by heteroscedasticity. Covariates like home values, 
neighborhood transiency, and rent are used to reduce error variance in the models. 
Variance inflation factors are also assessed in the regression analysis and demonstrate 
that the regression formulas have low levels of multicollinearity (Pardoe, 2018). All three 
regressions prove statistically significant at the 0.01 level.  
The second and third sections use descriptive statistics as the sample sizes are too 
small to allow meaningful regression analysis. Without the power of this regression 
analysis, no claims of causation can be made. However, the descriptive trends, in the 
context of the previous section’s analysis and the Community and Economic 
Development literature, are meaningful and should not be discounted. Graphs are 
presented for both sections to aid in the visualization of the data and trends. Additionally, 
maps of the five year change in median rent and income are shown for the third section. 
Those maps use census block groups, rather than tracts, as the unit of analysis to show an 
even more precise description of what is happening in the city. Where data is presented 
for the block groups, it varies from the data presented for the census tract. Both units of 
analysis use Census Bureau data.  
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Results 
 
High Poverty Tract Comparisons 
 
Tax Increment Financing is often employed in the hopes of precipitating new 
development, and the secondary effects of creating good paying jobs in construction and 
retail (Briffault, 2010; Dye and Merriman, 2006). There is no doubt that Allentown’s NIZ 
has precipitated new development and created some jobs in the construction of new 
buildings (Darragh, 2018). However, the picture is far less clear when the goals of 
increased employment, decreased poverty, growing tax bases, and increased wages are 
considered. It is impossible to prove a counterfactual to NIZ development (i.e. what 
would have happened without the intervention). But, what researchers can do is examine 
the results observed in comparison to what we would have expected to happen in the 
absence of the intervention. To do this, I utilize three difference of difference regressions 
between the 11 high poverty tracts adjacent to the NIZ and the 45 other high poverty 
tracts in comparable cities throughout the state. The regressions are all premised on the 
Parallel Trend Assumption – prior to NIZ construction, the difference between the 
control and intervention groups in the three variables remained relatively constant 
(Lechner, 2010).   
The first regression, addressing poverty rates in the census tracts, finds that the 
NIZ development is statistically connected to smaller reductions in poverty within the 
treatment group then are experienced by the control group to a 95% confidence interval 
(Table 1). In other words, given no NIZ development, we would expect the NIZ adjacent 
census tracts to have experienced a statistically larger reduction in poverty over the 
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treatment time. From 2013 to 2017, the NIZ adjacent tracts have a reduction in the 
poverty rate from 39.7% to 39.4%, a near-negligible reduction. Meanwhile, the similar 
high poverty tracts throughout the state experience a reduction from 45.4% to 39.8%, a 
considerable drop in poverty rates over five years. The difference between these two 
differences is enough to assert a causal relationship between the NIZ development and 
the tepid decreases in poverty experienced by the surround tracts, in the context where 
similar tracts statewide have a precipitous improvement.  
Table 1: Effect of NIZ-Adjacency on Poverty Rate in High-Poverty PA Census Tracts 
  Coefficient Standard Error Significance  
NIZ-Adjacent (Interaction Variable) 7.269 2.04 0.013* 
Individual Median Income -0.001 0.000 0.000* 
Unemployment Rate 0.197 0.101 0.053 
Annual Residential Transience 0.084 0.065 0.198 
Constant  64.419 3.932 0.000 
        
Model Significance     0.0000 
R^2      0.6135 
N      112 
 
The second regression addresses unemployment rates. The model finds no 
statistical difference between the control and treatment variables. This means that despite 
the NIZ development, and the assumption of job creation, the neighborhoods around the 
NIZ see no statistical decrease in unemployment compared against what is expected to 
happen without the development (Table 2). The treatment group sees a decrease in 
unemployment from 21.5% to 16.6% percent, a demonstrable improvement. However, 
the control group sees decreases from 20.6% to 17.0%. The model is assessing whether 
or not the NIZ development caused significant improvements in the unemployment rate 
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compared to the control group. The interaction variable signifying NIZ construction is far 
from significant, meaning the observed decreases in unemployment cannot be attributed 
to the NIZ, but rather a series of other factors influencing employment throughout the 
state. Over this period, drastic reductions in unemployment are realized at both the state 
and national level due to economic recovery from the Great Recession (Census Bureau, 
2013 – 2017).    
 
Table 2: Effect of NIZ-Adjacency on Unemployment in High-Poverty PA Census Tracts 
  Coefficient Standard Error Significance  
NIZ-Adjacent (Interaction Variable) -1.933 2.686 0.473 
Individual Median Income 0.000 0.000 0.025* 
Median Home Value 0.000 0.000 0.004* 
Annual Residential Transience 0.003 0.063 0.967 
Constant  30.233 3.433 0.000 
        
Model Significance     0.0002 
R^2      0.2214 
N      112 
 
Finally, the third regression assesses the effects of NIZ development on the 
median individual income across census tracts. Similar to unemployment rates, the 
treatment group sees no statistically significant improvement in median individual 
income over the five years (Table 3). The 11 adjacent tracts see an average increase in 
median income from $24,495 to $29,508, a sizable gain. At the same time, the 45 control 
tracts see an average increase in median income from $23,715 to $26,875. Again, 
because the variable is far from significant, no causal link can be drawn between NIZ 
development and increases in median income that occurred as a result, outside of the 
general economic improvement that is impacting high poverty tracts throughout the state.  
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Table 3: Effect of NIZ-Adjacency on Individual Median Income in High-Poverty PA Census Tracts 
  Coefficient Standard Error Significance  
NIZ-Adjacent (Interaction Variable) 1402.035 1931.849 0.470 
Unemployment -233.656 66.172 0.001* 
Rent 28.401 2.583 0.000* 
Transience -135.714 44.217 0.003* 
Constant  11946.300 2389.346 0.000 
        
Model Significance     0.0000 
R^2      0.605 
N      112 
 
Factors that potentially influence these outcomes will be discussed later in the 
paper. The results from these three regressions point to a failure on the part of the NIZ for 
improving economic conditions in the adjacent high poverty census tracts. Five years 
after the development started, they have higher rates of poverty than would be expected 
without the Neighborhood Improvement Zone. Furthermore, despite the assumption of 
good paying jobs, neither employment rates nor incomes are statistically better than the 
outcomes observed throughout the state. While there are improvements in both 
employment and income, they cannot be attributed to NIZ development. Rather, their 
improvements are more likely influenced by the waning recession that influenced high 
poverty neighborhoods throughout the state. 
 
City-Wide Comparisons 
 
 For city-wide comparisons, the five control cities are grouped and their outcomes 
averaged to produce a single value against which Allentown’s are compared. No causal 
link can be drawn from the data, but as presented below, it will be clear that despite one 
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of the largest subsidies in state history (Assad, 2017), Allentown lags behind other 
midsized, class three cities. The metrics assessed are changes in income, owner 
occupancy rates, poverty rates, rent prices, unemployment, home values, unit vacancy 
rates, housing cost burdens, and neighborhood transience. The metrics are selected from 
studies that do a better job than most of truly understanding the economic impact of 
development policies (Ehlenz, 2015; Swenson, 2015), and supplemented with metrics 
available through the American Community Survey, can more fully encapsulate the 
economic situation of a neighborhood.  
The first metric assessed is overall poverty rate between Allentown and the five 
control cities (Figure 1). In 2013, Allentown has a poverty rate of 27.80%. Over the five 
years of NIZ development, this rate slightly decreases to 27.30%, a drop of 0.50 
percentage points. Meanwhile, the five cities average a decrease of 2.32 percentage 
points from 29.44% to 27.12%. In fact, every one of the five control cities sees at least 
double the rate of decrease in poverty over the same time as Allentown, with cities like 
Lancaster and Bethlehem decreasing more than 2.5 percentage points. Allentown and the 
five comparable cities all experience increasing poverty leading into 2013, a trend 
mirrored throughout the state. By 2014, Allentown sees a drop in the poverty rate while 
the average of the control cities continues to rise. However, starting in 2014 and 
continuing every year thereafter, Allentown’s poverty rate continues to increase while the 
average of the control cities steadily decreases, eventually falling lower than Allentown’s 
rate by 2017.  
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 The next metric assessed is median income. Both Allentown and the five control 
cities see great income growth between 2013 and 2017. Like poverty, the five control 
cities see larger increases than Allentown. In 2013, Allentown’s median household 
income is $35,560. By 2017, it increases to $38,522 – an increase of 8.3%. The average 
of the five comparable cities increases from $34,763 to $38,508 over that time, or a 
10.8% increase. Only Harrisburg and Reading see lower income growth than Allentown 
during that time.  
 The median monthly rent in Allentown increases 6.50% between 2013 and 2017, 
from $881 to $938. This rate is actually lower than the increase seen across all five 
control cities, the average of which increases 8.60% from $752 to $816. This is a notable 
finding considering the often made claim that Allentown is experiencing dramatic 
increases in rents. This figure is just a median number, and not reflective of how 
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individuals’ rates might change over time. It should also be noted that Allentown still has 
a considerably higher median rent than all of the control cities except Bethlehem. These 
two metrics factor into an index variable called the housing cost burden. It assesses how 
much renters and owners spend on housing costs as a percentage of monthly household 
income. Any percentage over 30% of monthly income towards housing costs is 
considered by the United States Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) 
to be cost-burdened (HUD, 2018). The percentages at multiple income levels are 
aggregated to find a percentage for the cities. Allentown has a cost burdened rate of 
49.5% in 2013, meaning nearly half of all housing units (renting and owning combined) 
cost more than 30% of the household income. In 2017, this rate slightly decreases to 
45.9%, a drop of 3.6 percentage points2. This drop is primarily driven by income growth 
exceeding the growth in the cost of housing. The five control cities have a cost burdened 
rate of 43.8% in 2013, which falls 4.4 percentage points to 39.4% in 2017. The larger 
drop is partially attributable to faster growth in wages than in Allentown, despite housing 
costs increasing faster too. Reading is the only city of the five controls that has a higher 
cost burdened percentage in 2017 than Allentown.  
 One of the most dramatic changes over the five years of this study is Allentown’s 
change in homeownership rates. In 2013, 48.2% of all housing units in the city are 
owner-occupied. Every subsequent year, Allentown’s homeownership rates falls to 
eventually be 43.4% in 2017, a 4.8 percentage point decrease. The control cities have an 
                                                          
2 Homeowners see a slightly larger decrease in units being cost burdened than do renters. Over the five-
year period, homeowners decrease in cost burden by 6.0 percentage points while renters decrease by 4.2 
percentage points. However, renters are far more likely to be cost burden over the entirety of the period 
assessed. In 2013, 64.3% of all renters are cost burdened and by 2017 that is down to 60.1%. Only 37.3% 
of homeowners are cost burdened in 2013, and that drops to 31.3% by 2017.  
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average home ownership rate of 46.4% in 2013, which slowly declines 1.8 percentage 
points to 44.6% (Figure 2). This decrease will be analyzed further in the discussion 
section of this paper, but signifies a large transition in Allentown’s housing stock over the 
duration of this study compared to what is happening in comparable midsized cities 
throughout the state.  
 
 Another metric of interest where Allentown differs drastically from the five 
control cities is the median home value for owner occupied units. In 2013, the median 
value is $132,200 in Allentown. By 2017, it falls by 6.2% to $124,000 (Figure 3). 
Meanwhile the average median home value of owner occupied units in the five control 
cities remains almost unchanged over that same time. In 2013, it is $103,420. By 2017, it 
drops a negligible 0.04% to $103,380. Harrisburg and Bethlehem also see decreases in 
 25 
median home value over that time, but Erie, Lancaster, and Reading all see dramatic 
increases. Possible causes of this disparity will be discussed later.  
 
 Four final metrics are compared between the cities, but the trends from 2013 to 
2017 are not significantly different. Unemployment in Allentown drops by 3 percentage 
points over the five years. The control cities see an average drop in the unemployment 
rate of a slightly higher 3.8 percentage points. Each of the control cities sees a larger drop 
than Allentown except Erie. The second trend that is relatively even between the cities is 
vacancy rates of owner-occupied housing. Allentown sees a miniscule increase of 0.1 
percentage points while the five control cities average an increase of 0.4 percentage 
points. The renter vacancy in Allentown has a very modest decrease of 1.4 percentage 
points. The average renter vacancy across the five control cities decreases by 0.2 
percentage points. Reading has a large increase in renter vacancy over this time which 
NIZ Development Start 
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skews the average down, but the other four cities see very close decreases to what 
Allentown experiences. Lastly, Allentown sees a slight decrease in transiency by 0.8 
percentage points. This is a measurement of how many people are living in the same unit 
as they were the year before. The five control cities average a decrease of 0.6 percentage 
points over this same time. These four trends do not vary much between Allentown and 
the control cities. The major difference over the five-year timespan is incomes, owner 
occupancy tenure, poverty, median rent, home value of owner occupied units, and 
housing cost burden.    
 
Changes within Allentown 
 
This final section tries to understand the spill-over effects of NIZ developments. 
Median incomes, median rent, an index variable for rent to income, and homeownership 
are presented for three different sections of the city and the city’s rate. The three sections 
are the NIZ, NIZ-adjacent tracts, and non-adjacent tracts. The median rent within the NIZ 
increases 10.3% between 2013 and 2017. NIZ adjacent tracts average a smaller increase 
of 6.8%. Non-adjacent tracts average an increase of 7.4%, while the city as a whole 
increases 6.5% (Figure 4). The map included below shows net changes to median rent 
from 2013 – 2017. Census block groups are used rather than tracts. The block group is a 
further division within a tract that generally consists of between 600 and 3,000 people 
(Census Bureau, 2018). The NIZ zone, a smaller census block group within tract 97, is 
crosshatched and sees an increase in median rent of 41% over the five year timeframe, 
making it one of the faster areas of increase. Many of the block groups immediately 
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adjacent see smaller growth in rents with only a few block groups throughout the city 
seeing even 20% growth (Figure 5). 
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Over that same time, the NIZ sees an increase in median household income of a 
staggering 19.4%. The NIZ adjacent tracts average an increase of 12.6%. The non-
adjacent tracts average an increase of 10.3%. The city wide median income increases 
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8.3%. The sections of the city are grouped and averaged to calculate the adjacent and 
non-adjacent figures. Within these tracts the populations are not uniform therefore if the 
larger tracts performs better, the data will slightly skew to undercount the impact. If the 
smaller tracts perform better, the data will slightly skew to over count the impact. 
Additionally, these are area specific measurements. An increase in median income does 
not necessarily mean the same people receive more income the following year, it could 
instead indicate the people earning more money moved into the census tract, either 
displacing original residents or adding to the population of the area.  
The map included below shows net changes to median income from 2013 – 2017. 
Again, census block groups are used rather than tracts. The NIZ zone is crosshatched and 
sees an increase in median income of $7,500 over the five-year time frame, making it one 
of the faster increasing areas. Many of the block groups immediately north see decreased 
median income over time, with the largest growth happening on the South Side of the 
city, far removed of the NIZ and the adjacent tracts (Figure 6).  
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The index variable median rent to income ratio uses the two previous metrics to 
assess how much of the median household’s income is used to pay median rent. This does 
not capture the housing costs of homeowners and does not necessarily represent any 
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given person’s situation. It could be the case that someone earning well below the median 
income pays a rent much higher than the median rent, in which case they would likely be 
extremely cost burdened. Rather, this is a conceptual statistic used to approximate what is 
the common cost burden in a given neighborhood. All three areas see decreases in the 
median rent to income ratio because incomes increase faster than rents do during the time 
of this study. The NIZ sees the largest decrease in the rent to income ratio of 4.1 
percentage points. The adjacent tracts average a decrease of 2.3 percentage points. The 
non-adjacent tracts average a decrease of 1.7 percentage points. City wide, the median 
rent to income ratio decreases 0.5 percentage points.  
Homeownership trends are remarkably similar between NIZ-adjacent and non-
adjacent tracts. The city sees an overall decrease in homeownership of 4.8 percentage 
points. The NIZ-adjacent and non-adjacent tracts see average decreases in 
homeownership of 4.7 percentage points and 4.8 percentage points, respectively. 
Meanwhile, the NIZ itself sees an increase in homeownership of 2 percentage points. 
While the NIZ is one of the fastest increasing areas of homeownership within the city, it 
still has remarkably low rates. In 2017, only 6.2% of residents within the NIZ are living 
in a home they own – the lowest rate of any census tract in the city. The NIZ sees modest 
gains in homeownership while the rate falls precipitously across NIZ-adjacent and non-
adjacent tracts alike.  
 
Discussion 
 
High Poverty Tract Comparisons 
As stated earlier, it is impossible to prove the counterfactual. There is no way to 
know what the current state of Allentown’s economic metrics would be today had the 
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NIZ development not occurred. This paper employs difference in difference regressions 
because they allow researchers to approximate a reasonable counterfactual and use that to 
estimate a causal effect (Lechner, 2010). With a strong model and strict adherence to the 
requisite assumptions of difference in difference regressions, researchers are able to 
calculate an average treatment effect (ATE) to quantify the impact of a given policy on 
the treatment group (Lechner, 2010). This paper does not try to calculate the ATE 
because the data encapsulating the NIZ development is still new and the potential impact 
of the NIZ is limited in time. As more years of American Community Survey data 
accumulate, future researchers might look to calculate the ATE of the NIZ on poverty 
rates, incomes, and property values.  
In addition to allowing for a reasonable approximation of the counterfactual that 
enables estimations of causal effects, difference in difference regression are also intuitive 
and reasonably account for changes due to covariates (Lechner, 2010; Columbia 
University Mailman School of Public Health, 2013). As such, a strong model that meets 
the assumptions is a powerful tool for assessing causation in observed natural 
experiments with repeated cross-sectional data.  
The first regression looks to assess poverty levels across the high poverty census 
tracts. The 11 high poverty census tracts comprising the treatment group see almost no 
decrease in the number of individuals living below the poverty line between 2013 and 
2017. On the other hand, the 45 control tracts see a major decrease in poverty – from an 
average of 45.4% of residents below the poverty line to 39.8% by 2017. The model and 
NIZ interaction variable both prove statistically significant beyond the 95% confidence 
interval. The NIZ interaction variable has a positive coefficient of 7.269. This means that 
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being a high poverty census tract adjacent to the NIZ during the first five years of 
development is causally linked with higher poverty rates than would have been expected 
with no NIZ. This finding is very much consistent with the literature that finds that TIF-
adopting municipalities do not precipitate overall growth for the city, but rather shift the 
resources to a specific zone at the expense of other regions (Dye and Merriman, 2003; 
Dye and Merriman, 2006; Chapple and Jacobus, 2009).  
Poverty, officially falling below $24,600 for a family of four in 2017 (US 
Department of Health and Human Services, 2017), is either eased or exacerbated by a 
number of factors like housing expenses, medical expenses, taxes, government backed 
supplemental income, returns on investment, and more. As will be discussed in regards to 
the other two regressions, incomes and unemployment rates cannot explain why the 
poverty rate remains higher than would be expected without NIZ development in the 
adjacent high poverty tracts. This paper cannot isolate the specific mechanism keeping 
the poverty rates persistently high, but can suggest a few plausible explanations. 
The NIZ development, like other TIFs, has diverted a significant amount of city 
resources to the commercial corridor. If city services like housing inspections, policing, 
and street beautification are enhanced in the NIZ, without reciprocal increases in the 
other neighborhoods, it leads to a loss of services and disinvestment in those regions. 
Additionally, consolidating commercial activity in a specific corridor can detract from 
commerce that would have otherwise occurred in the surrounding neighborhoods. The 
new investment downtown can increase cost of living expenses and lead to increased 
speculation of property as an investment vehicle in the surrounding neighborhoods. 
Additionally, in 2017, $2,962,981.20 of local non-property taxes raised within the NIZ 
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was transferred into the Neighborhood Improvement Zone Fund (PA Department of 
Revenue, 2018). These funds would, without the NIZ sequestration, go to the city’s 
municipal taxing authority to be used on citywide projects. Instead, they were earmarked 
to be specifically used within the NIZ to pay back bonds issued for the PPL Center and 
the debt service on adjacent developments. It is possible that any of these situations, or an 
interaction of these dynamics, have reduced access to opportunity that would allow 
residents to climb out of poverty. There might be further explanations not explored here. 
Whatever the exact cause, some dynamic conferred by NIZ development has meant 
persistently high rates of poverty in the surrounding neighborhoods that, given the 
experience of high poverty tracts throughout the state, would not be expected in the 
absence of the NIZ. 
 The other two regressions look at unemployment rates and median incomes. Both 
models meet the assumptions required for a difference in difference analysis and prove 
statistically significant. However, in neither model is the dependent variable able to reach 
significance. It is thus concluded that the NIZ development did not have a significant 
impact on raising median incomes or reducing unemployment within these high poverty 
tracts adjacent to the NIZ. Observationally, employment rates do improve and wages do 
increase; however, that is a trend observed in the control tracts as well, and the scale of 
the increase is not enough to conclude that the NIZ development has a demonstrable 
impact on those two metrics. It is more likely that a generally improving national and 
state economy helps to bolster these metrics in the high poverty tracts throughout 
Allentown and the comparable cities.  
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 Taken together, the three regressions point to a failure of the NIZ as a community 
and economic development tool for the high poverty tracts surrounding it. The NIZ’s 
success depends upon what metrics are applied. It has successfully generated construction 
that would not have otherwise occurred but for the legislation authorizing the special tax 
district. This new zone has also created retail jobs and luxury apartments that did not 
exist prior to the development (Darragh, 2018). However, if it is viewed as a strategy for 
city-wide economic development that decreases poverty, expands opportunity, and lifts 
incomes, the evidence does not support the rhetoric.         
 
City-Wide Comparisons 
While the observational data presented for the city-wide comparisons do not have 
the causal explanatory power of regressions, they, taken in context with those 
regressions, point to a severe shortcoming in the Neighborhood Improvement Zone as a 
tactic for city-level community and economic development. None of the trends examined 
can be said to be the result of the NIZ, but they do happen in spite of the NIZ. As 
mentioned, when the development is complete, the NIZ will be one of the largest tax 
subsidies in Pennsylvania history. It is an unprecedented quasi-TIF that allows developers 
to sequester far more taxes than other tax increment development subsidies. With this in 
mind, we would expect that, nine years after the legislation is passed, and five years after 
the construction begins in force, Allentown would be better situated economically than 
comparable cities that do not receive the same special taxing zone or nearly the same 
investment. And yet, as the data presented shows, Allentown is not only not 
outperforming those cities, it is clearly lagging behind them. Income growth over the 
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study period is less in Allentown than four of the five control cities; only Harrisburg sess 
slower growth, and the control cities average median income growth 2.5 percentage 
points higher than Allentown.  
Similarly, only Erie sees a smaller decrease in unemployment than Allentown. 
The control cities average a larger decrease, albeit modestly, by 0.8 percentage points. 
While the NIZ construction and subsequent retail, entertainment, and service businesses 
create some jobs in Allentown, they are not even enough to keep pace with the income 
growth or reductions in unemployment that the other non-treatment cities experience. It 
then follows that there are other development policies, tools, and best practices that could 
precipitate intended job creation and wage growth more cost-effectively than large scale 
TIF development. Left without the NIZ intervention, Allentown could possibly have 
experienced larger wage growth and reductions in unemployment had it followed the 
development strategies of the five control cities.     
Owner occupancy, as a percentage of total housing units, drastically decreases in 
Allentown over the five years of this study. The city goes from 48.2% owner occupied 
housing to 43.4%, by 2017. That drop is 3 percentage points higher than the average of 
the control cities. According to housing tenure data through the American Community 
Survey, Allentown adds nearly 2,000 new rentals during those five years and loses nearly 
reciprocal amounts of owner occupied housing (American Community Survey, 2013 – 
2017). Vacancy rates of both rental and owner-occupied housing do decrease over this 
time, but not nearly enough to explain the changes in units occupied by housing tenure 
(American Community Survey, 2013 – 2017). The 2,000 further rental units occupied, 
and subsequent drop in owner-occupancy, is a product of new apartments being built, and 
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more importantly, the conversion of owner occupied housing into rental properties. 
Additionally, it is emblematic of housing in Allentown being used more and more as a 
means of financial investment. Owning rental units returns dividends in form of rent, and 
capital gains when sold at a higher market value than purchased. When the housing of a 
neighborhood is owned by the person residing in the building, there is more incentive to 
make mortgage payments (Robinson and Todd, 2010), more investment in the building’s 
appearance, better environmental stewardship, and more civic engagement (Dietz and 
Haurin, 2003). A study published in the Journal of Urban Economics finds that 
transitioning a unit from renter-occupied to owner-occupied has a positive external 
benefit of $1,300 on the neighborhood (Coulson and Li, 2013). The converse is not 
argued in the paper, but the implications that follow are that every unit converted from an 
owner-occupied home to a rental unit costs some external benefit to the neighborhood. 
Housing values are based off of both the underlying asset and the neighborhood 
conditions. If neighborhoods are struggling, the values of the homes in that neighborhood 
are likely to suffer as well (Robinson and Todd, 2010). It follows then that some of 
Allentown’s steep decline in home values is a partial product of this conversion from 
owner-occupied to renter-occupied. This also has detrimental impacts on quality of life 
for the neighborhoods that see potential services diverted. Allentown sees a 6.2% 
decrease in the median home value of owner-occupied houses from 2013 to 2017; the 
median value drops nearly $8,000. Meanwhile, the control cities average a loss of $40, or 
0.04%. This has ripple effects on individuals’ equity, amount of credit available, and on 
the services available to neighborhoods that are funded by the city and school district 
through millage rates factored against the assessed property value. The fact that the 
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median home value falls nearly $8,000 over the timeframe of a massive subsidy meant, in 
part, to increase property taxes, is shocking.  
Allentown does have a decreasing housing cost burden, an aggregation of both 
renters and owners, from 2013 to 2017. This is a product of rising wages outpacing rising 
housing costs, notably rent. Homeowners experience a large drop in cost burdened units 
over this time and have rates nearly half that of renters’ cost burden. And yet, despite this 
improvement, the decrease in households spending more than 30% of their monthly 
income on housing is a lesser decrease than in every control city except Erie. The five 
controls average a decrease of 4.4 percentage points in their housing cost burden rate. 
Allentown decreases 3.6 percentage points. This is mainly due to slower wage growth, 
because as reported earlier, rents in Allentown do not increase as quickly as they do in 
the control cities.  
This smaller decrease in housing cost burden, conversions in housing tenure, 
decreasing home values, and lagging unemployment and median wage statistics help 
elucidate some of the reasons that poverty has remained persistently high over the course 
of this study. Allentown sees almost no drop in the percentage of residents living below 
the poverty line from 2013 to 2017. Every one of the control cities sees at least double the 
drop in their poverty rate that Allentown experiences, which is 0.5 percentage points over 
the course of five years. The control cities average a decrease of 2.3 percentage points. 
This creates a vicious cycle wherein the underlying tax base needed to fund services is 
incapable of properly funding the services that would be needed to help reduce the 
burden of poverty. In this context, outside investment could theoretically be a boon to a 
struggling city. The issue with Allentown’s Neighborhood Improvement Zone, to this 
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point, has been that the investment has only been available to a handful of developers and 
large corporate clients – not to many people and small businesses that comprise the vast 
majority of Allentown’s tax base and constituency.  
Assessing Allentown’s economic trends from 2013 to 2017 using the metrics 
herein reveals a stark contrast. It is the site of an extreme investment of capital, and yet 
five years after the development begins, the city is doing worse by nearly every metric 
than comparable mid-sized Pennsylvanian cities. These trends are not able to assert 
causation. Allentown’s median home value cannot be said to decrease $8,000 over five 
years because of the NIZ. However, it decreases that amount in spite of the NIZ.  
 
Changes within Allentown 
 
This final section of analysis looks at the extent to which benefits of the NIZ have 
spilled over into the adjacent areas. As with other CED and TIF projects, the benefits of 
the investment in the NIZ have been largely isolated to the district itself (Dye and 
Merriman, 2003; Dye and Merriman, 2006; Chapple and Jacobus, 2009). The non-
adjacent and adjacent tracts see relatively similar average growth in median income from 
2013 to 2017, 10.3% and 12.6% respectively. Meanwhile, the NIZ tract has an increase 
of 19.4%. At the same time, the nonadjacent tracts see average median rent increase 
7.4%. The adjacent tracts increase a similar 6.8%. The NIZ, however, increases 10.3%. 
These two trends combine to create an index variable, median rent to income ratio, which 
is again better for the NIZ. It sees a decrease of 4.1 percentage points while the non-
adjacent and adjacent tracts see respective decreases of 1.7 and 2.3 percentage points.  
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Furthermore, when mapped according to more precise census block group, the 
NIZ block group, Lehigh County Census Tract 97.01, is one of the highest growing 
groups in both income and rent. Meanwhile, most of the adjacent block groups either see 
declines or modest growth. In both cases, the only block groups to outperform the NIZ 
are on the city’s South Side or in the northeast of center city – both non-adjacent areas. 
Lastly, while homeownership is falling uniformly across both the NIZ-adjacent and non-
adjacent tracts, the NIZ is one of the only areas within the city to see increasing rates of 
homeownership.  
Addendum I, at the end of this paper, shows a seven year change in total property 
value appraised by census block group. It was prepared using Lehigh County data by 
Karen Beck-Pooley and is not included in the results of this study because it does not 
exactly overlap the five-year timeframe assessed herein. However, what emerges is that 
LC 97.01 sees by far the greatest increase in assessed property value between 2010 and 
2017. The reasonable conclusion is that much of that unmatched growth happens due to 
NIZ development – which is active for more than half of the time of that increase.  What 
emerges from these cumulative indices is that the NIZ well outperforms the averages of 
the rest of the city’s tracts, which irrespective of proximity, perform about the same. 
Individual block groups throughout the city also fare well, but when taken in the 
neighborhood context, no single area keeps pace with the NIZ’s improvements. 
Furthermore, those block groups that fare well are far removed of the NIZ 
geographically, and cannot be attributed to its commercial success. Thus, the conclusion 
is that NIZ has minimal, if any, spillover benefits to the adjacent tracts beyond how the 
rest of the city’s tracts trend.  
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Moreover, because of the high transiency of Allentown’s neighborhoods 
(American Community Survey, 2013 -2017), it is impossible to say, using census data, 
whether the benefits conferred to the NIZ are enjoyed by the people who lived there prior 
to development, or whether the improved economic metrics are a result of newcomers 
with more resources. Ultimately, to assess that question, city/county records identifying 
home sales and landlords’ records of tenants would need to be examined. That is outside 
the scope of this report. However, it would be a meaningful finding in light of this report 
and should be done to better understand the changes underway in and around 
Allentown’s Neighborhood Improvement Zone.  
 
 
Conclusion 
While tax increment financing development has been used broadly since the 
1970s, comprehensive studies of its impact have been too few and too limited. 
Furthermore, Allentown’s Neighborhood Improvement Zone, which is resonant of TIFs 
but unprecedented in terms of the types of taxes eligible to be diverted and its scale, is 
completely unexamined in the ways that it continues to affect the city. We are currently 
less than a decade into a thirty-year tax incentive with the most up to date data only 
capturing the first five years of development. Time will tell the success of the 
development spurred on by the NIZ, but in the meantime it is important to take stock of 
what the impacts have been so far. As new data becomes available it is important for 
these assessments to be updated in order to fully understand the policy’s impacts and 
allow for changes to make the revitalization efforts more effective.  
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Still, the picture that emerges after five years of development is a bleak one. 
Allentown as a whole is experiencing huge investment in the downtown commercial 
corridor as a result of the NIZ, but that is not transcending into improved living 
conditions for residents, at least not when compared to other comparable cities. At the 
same time as hundreds of millions of dollars are being funneled into downtown 
development, the adjacent high poverty neighborhoods see tepid wage growth, stagnant 
levels of poverty, and decreases in property values. One possible explanation for this is 
that resources like policing and code enforcement are being diverted downtown to the 
detriment of the neighborhoods. Additionally, the local taxes sequestered by the NIZ 
Fund could otherwise be spent in these neighborhoods.  
Allentown does not keep up with similar cities without NIZ development in many 
key metrics of economic success like poverty, incomes, unemployment, home values, and 
home ownership. Nor is it able to pass the benefits of the NIZ investment on to its 
neighborhoods beyond the census tract encompassing the Neighborhood Improvement 
Zone. It seems likely that any economic improvement to the NIZ area are largely driven 
by an influx of new residents, at the expense of those who lived there previously; 
residents in adjacent areas see decreased property values, increased rents, and only 
modest improvements in employment rates. The important conclusion of this paper is that 
while the NIZ has been successful in attracting new business investments and has 
returned modest tax increases to the school district (Zimmerman, 2017), it is not an 
effective method of improving quality of life for the city in general. This finding is in 
accordance with much of the literature that suggests Tax Increment Financing is 
successful at developing spaces, but not human capital.  
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Other policies should be explored, in tandem with the continued development, to 
ensure that the projected subsidy of well over $1 billion is not directed to developers and 
landlords to the complete exclusion of the residents of the city. It might be the case that 
as more development occurs and more wealthy residents move downtown the city will 
reach a critical threshold allowing for the expansion of benefits to the community. City 
and school district budgets might begin to see real returns that allow them to end the 
structural deficits they are projected to run over the coming years (Opilo, 2018; Palochko 
2018). However, as observed so far, the NIZ does not explicitly have a mechanism to 
drive investment into Allentown’s neighborhood. This five-year assessment should serve 
as a warning that the NIZ, and TIFs in general, are not sufficient to revitalize struggling 
cities alone. They need to be accompanied by other policies that ensure investment 
happens outside of the specific corridors, and that development in one region does not 
deter growth elsewhere. This study should serve as neither a condemnation nor 
endorsement of the NIZ in general; however, as a standalone development strategy, the 
NIZ has so far failed. While making explicit recommendations is outside the scope of this 
report, it is my view that some other policies must be enacted, in order to complement the 
development prompted by the NIZ, if the goal of neighborhood revitalization is to be 
achieved.  
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Addendum I 
 
 
 
Source: Lehigh County Appraisal Data. Prepared by Dr. Karen Beck-Pooley  
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